In addition, it is only ones own mental information that is relevant to determining whether one is justified in believing that p. For example, my belief that Jones was in Buffalo at the time the crime was committed is not relevant to determining whether you are justified in believing that Jones committed the crime. Evidentialism appears unable to account for this. 1. Reason and Belief in God.. (This last modification is intended to accommodate the foundationalist thesis that only the more basic can justify the less basic. Introduction. They write that doxastic attitude, d, toward p is justified for one at t if and only if ones evidence at t supports ones taking d towards p (15). This is especially important to note because exactly the sorts of considerations regarding skepticism DeRose invokes motivate contextualism in general and contextualist versions of evidentialism in particular. (49-50). The second premise is that if this first premise is true, then (EVI) is false. Perhaps the detective is utterly unable to understand how the evidence he has gathered supports this proposition. In the context of discussing theories of evidentialism in general, it is important to note this contextualist dimension of his argument, and Ill make reference to it below. Suppose, however, that although my belief that Micks reports are unreliable and the testimony that such is the case are still stored in my long-term memory, I am presently unable to recall them. He writes with clarity and verve, and his discussion is uniformly insightful. In short: it is immoral to hold a belief that is not supported by the positive weight of evidence. There are cases in the neighborhood that avoid Aikins reply whether or not basing reasons are in play. Here, we focus primarily on the latter. Evidentialists reply by trying to flesh out the platitude with an account of evidence. The following is one such example. Evidentialism does not take into account ones evidence-gathering and, thus, cannot account for this intuition. Social Sciences. The essay ends with some not very satisfactory comments on what we should do with scientific knowledge, where we dont have access to the (direct, first-order) evidence itself. University of Rochester We also have that duty to other people. If, as seems plausible, the results of a method for identifying truths cannot be good evidence-providing reasons for the reliability of that very method, we have insufficient evidence to believe that induction is reliable. The present section focuses on complexities with the notion of support. For example, non-contextualist evidentialists can utilize some closure principle or inference to the best explanation to try to account for the degree to which we think we are justified in believing that skeptical hypotheses are false. William James on Risk, Efficacy, and Evidentialism We would need to wait until authors such as David Christensen with discussions of higher-order evidence (evidence from experts) to tackle such difficulties. It seems wrong to say that one is justified in believing that these extremely complex propositions are true. It leaves us bare and powerless where we thought that we were safe and strong. It should be no surprise, then, that the traditional view holds that one is justified only if one has adequate reasons for belief. An immediate result is that ones evidence for p may be enough to make believing p justified in one context (where the conversationally-determined standards for justification are relatively low) while failing to make believing p justified in another context (where the standards for justification are much higher). Finally, determine whether this portion of ones evidence makes the proposition more likely true than not. Evidentialism vs Non-Evidentialism - The Outspoken Blogger Students shared 748 documents in this course. Improve your grades. Though this by no means settles the issue, it does provide reason to try to work out a theory of justification that appeals solely to evidence. As I have defined it in (EVI), evidentialism is the thesis that one is justified in believing a proposition at a time if and only if ones evidence at that time supports believing that proposition. Clifford's Evidentialism. To Clifford and other atheist evidentialists, believing and arguing on something was senseless. As well as Clifford's argument from the examples of the shipowner, the consequences of credulity and his defence against skepticism, this book tackles James's conditions for a genuine option . The traditional responses to skepticism are exactly the responses that non-contextualist evidentialists have available. Various other accounts of having evidence can be developed that allow for varying degrees of availability or varying amounts of reflection. William James has famously argued that having adequate evidence is not necessary for one to believe justifiably. The view that justification is, in some substantive way, a deontological concept motivates the following three objections. Save my name, email, and website in this browser for the next time I comment. Simplifications 2. One such case is the Alpine Climber from James essay The Sentiment of Rationality. The climber can survive only if he completes a dangerous leap, his evidence that the leap will succeed is counterbalanced by the evidence against it, believing that the leap will not succeed and suspending judgment both lead to failure, and a successful leap is made more likely by the climbers believing in success. James holds that there are conditions under which it is morally permissible to believe a proposition that is not supported by sufficient evidence. Particular versions of evidentialism can diverge in virtue of their providing different claims about what sorts of things count as evidence, what it is for one to have evidence, and what it is for ones evidence to support believing a proposition. Some argue that the justification of a belief depends, at least in part, on the inquiry that led to the belief. Updated: Nov 18th, 2018 Introduction The Clifford and James philosophies on beliefs have various elements attached to their assertions. His second case is about agitators who spread lies about a group of religious people who dont believe in original sin, who published grave accusations against them. In the Will to Believe, James is partly responding to Clifford's The Ethics of Belief (1877) in which Clifford defends an evidentialist theory: which holds that you can only rationally hold a belief if there is enough evidence to support it, and you should only be as confident in the belief as your . While it is not epistemically permissible to flout our evidentialist duties, we do think that in certain cases it is in some sense permissible to violate them. PDF 'Clifford, William Kingdon' in: The Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Evidentialism (William Clifford) University: University of Delhi. The reply turns on two claims: (i) there can be no evidence against a principle to the effect that the unobserved resembles the observed (because a uniformity principle is required for systematic inquiry of any sort), and (ii) the principle can be understood as a prescriptive rule for the direction of inquiry (72-78). So, for example, if counterinduction is correct, the unobserved does not resemble the observed. One may here appeal to the distinction between propositional justification and doxastic justification in an effort to motivate the claim that the detective is justified in believing that Jones did it and the student is justified in believing that the argument is valid. Clifford's Evidentialism vs. Wager & Kierkegaard's Non-Evidentialism . Some propositions are too complicated and complex for a given person to entertain given his or her actual abilities, and other propositions are too complex for humans to even possibly entertain. Discussing the central themes from these seminal essays, Evidentialism and the Will to Believe explores the history of the ideas governing evidentialism. It seems it should be uncontroversial that ones evidence justifies one in believing that this skeptical scenario is false, yet justifying the denial of such skeptical scenarios is much more difficult than this implies. I think Cliffords own arguments support weaker version of evidentialism, and will get to this later. evidentialist argument - Mack 1 Saint Leo University W. K. Clifford According to foundationalism, a belief is justified if and only if: either it is a foundational belief or it is supported by beliefs which either are themselves foundational beliefs or are ultimately supported by foundational beliefs. First, DeRose argues that evidentialism appears unable to account for the degree to which he is justified in believing that particular skeptical scenarios are false (703-706). On this account, I am presently justified in believing that Mick is a reliable newscaster if and only if my stored memory belief that Mick is an unreliable newscaster (and its supporting evidence) is not easily available to me upon reflection. If IER is true, however, Mighty Caseys belief is impermissible. Since it is important for Mighty Casey to get a hit, and he can increase the probability of this outcome by believing in it, it seems that Mighty Casey has a good non-evidential reason to believe I will get a hit despite the fact that the evidence is against it whether or not he believes he will get a hit. According to a deontological conception of epistemic justification, one has an intellectual duty, requirement, or obligation to believe justifiably. (20 points) One, for example, might also count memories, apparent memories, or seemings-to-be-true as kinds of evidence. Traditional accounts have looked to ones available evidence or reasons for an answer. Knowing that movies usually show at the same time each day, he believes that it is showing today at 8:00 as well. Internalism Defended., Much that has been written on the internalism and externalism debate in epistemology is very relevant to evidentialism. Reading Clifford with fresh eyes, we can see how Clifford foresaw the destructive force of people believing what is most convenient to them, wishfully thinking, believing without any evidence, not cross-checking sources, and how this not only harms themselves but also their wider society. Clifford considers a ship owner who squelches his doubts about a vessels seaworthiness, ignores evidence against seaworthiness, foregoes repairs, and lets the ship sail to its doom. Alternatively, one might argue that one is not justified in believing a proposition if one could have easily discovered (or should have discovered) evidence that defeated ones present justification for it. If not, it is unjustified, for it is not supported by the evidence one has that is able to justify ones believing the proposition. For instance, the deontological conception of justification itself can motivate and help explain a companion deontological conception of evidential support. The fundamental lesson here is that the evidentialist needs to develop these consequences and defend them. Access to all documents. In general, only those states or properties that are themselves informational (or at least can directly and on their own communicate information to the subject) can properly be classified as evidential states or properties. We can conclude from the above that evidentialist theories can be formulated so as to account for widely divergent intuitions regarding cases. A strong version is Cliffords Principle (that its wrong, always, everywhere, and for everyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence). There are three chapters: one on Clifford, one on James, and one on religion and the ethics of belief, which contains Aikins own defense of evidentialism. It is worth noting that while evidentialists have available many options about what to count as kinds of evidence, not just anything mental can properly be classified as evidence. Religious Experience, Revelation and Tradition 9. Before proceeding, it is crucial to nail down more exactly what evidentialism is a theory of. The obvious restriction this imposes is that ones evidence includes only ones own mental states. Course: Philosophy. A professor and his wife are going to the movies to see Star Wars, Episode 68. A second objection targets the notion of ones evidence supporting a proposition. Aikin claims, however, that Clifford holds that what we are obligated to do is not a function of the consequences of our actions. This second response to the argument would need to be strengthened by considerations against the motivating deontological conception of epistemic justification, but considering these in this entry would take us too far astray. At the time, I believed that Mick was a very unreliable newscaster. In the philosophy classroom, one can easily conclude, based on the reading of James, that Clifford is unrealistic and just plain wrong in his evidentialism, hence that hes not worth engaging with. It might, as Aikin urges, be possible to provide non-evidential, practical reasons for such beliefs, but this does not show that they are permissible on evidentialist grounds. The idea here, I take it, is that the consequences of types of actions are used to individuate the duties that one has in virtue of ones roles, and those duties determine ones responsibility in particular cases. (10 points) (b) Explain in your own words one of the two reasons we might want to accept this principle even in the case of trivial beliefs? The structure of justification is part of evidential support, and it is because some propositions are more basic than other propositions that we cannot appeal to those less basic propositions in order to justify the more basic ones. Every rustic ..may help to kill or keep alive the fatal superstitions which clog his race. We think that one is not believing as one should when one believes something for no reason whatsoever or for very weak reasons. Evidentialism and non-evidentialism are two principles that are generally used as justification as to whether it makes sense for a person to believe or not believe in God. This is for two reasons. The book is full of arguments that are worthy of sustained attention. Clifford famously opens "The Ethics of Belief" with this passage and example: A shipowner was about to send to sea an emigrant-ship. Doubts had been suggested to him that possibly she was not seaworthy. Various responses are available to the evidentialist. In addition, one can appeal to cases like Feldmans logic student example (in section 3b. Many of the objections developed above apply only to some of these ways of developing the theory. (47). proportions his belief to the evidence, and he proceeds with this as his epistemic ideal (73). Philosophy Exam 4 Flashcards | Quizlet William Clifford. It is also evidence that counterinduction will be reliable in the future, if counterinduction is reliable. Second, DeRose claims that this difficulty highlights a fundamental complexity in the notion of evidence. Clifford takes the side of Evidentialism, which is the assertion t hat for a belief to be true knowledge, it must be supported by evidence. It includes their article, Evidentialism, which has come to be viewed as the definitive article on the theory. These arguments appear to be consequentialist: belief on the basis of insufficient evidence is impermissible because believing on the basis of evidence is our best guide to truth and false beliefs can have catastrophic consequences. The standard response to these types of examples is to distinguish between different kinds of demands, oughts, and duties and to hold that sometimes these conflict. IER prohibits both epistemic insolence believing contrary to the evidence one has and epistemic sloth believing contrary to readily available evidence one ought to have (25-27). In summary, while it is true that non-epistemic considerations can outweigh epistemic considerations, the epistemic considerations remain. Yet one does not have to stop there. How about tradition? Naturally, then, we see this traditional conception reflected in the writings of many influential philosophers. Department of Philosophy Daniel M. Mittag Yet, as Hume argues, such principles are not self-evident and, as Aikin notes, Without assuming the uniformity of nature, no experience or aggregation of them could be evidence of the uniformity beyond them (70, my emphasis). Evidentialism is vulnerable in the case of beliefs that seem to play an essential role in guiding the ways we manage evidence. As a result, Feldman concludes, evidentialism provides the correct answer about this case. Clifford applied an example of a man who had an out of order ship to . Together, these considerations can help to motivate ones evidentialist theory. Info More info. Clifford's Evidentialist and Blaise Pascal's Non-Evidentialist Evidentialism owes us an explanation of this. When we think about what it takes for one to believe reasonably or justifiably, we think that one has to have good reasons (or, more accurately, adequate reason for thinking the proposition in question is true). It leaves us vulnerable, because we might have to give up beliefs we deeply care about if the relevant evidence we receive changes. A contextualist version of evidentialism will hold that when skeptical scenarios are not being discussed, people are justified in believing to a very high degree that skeptical scenarios do not obtain. Evidentialism in evangelical Christian apologetics should be carefully distinguished from epistemological evidentialism, which adheres to W. K. Clifford's dictum that "it is wrong, everywhere, always, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." 2 Clifford's maxim has rightly been questioned from a variety of perspectives. In order to be justified on such a view, one must not only follow ones evidence but also gather evidence in an epistemically responsible way. That was his world, he lived in the mindset of numbers and the infallible nature of 2+2 always equaling four. Clifford spent most of his career life doing philosophical work and Mathematics at the Cambridge University. The Ethics of Belief: A brief history 1.1 Origins of the debate 1.2 The ethics of belief before the 19 th -century 2. No, says Clifford, not only experts, even common people cannot just believe whatever they want. In these cases the target proposition P is such that rejecting and withholding P have the same consequences for action (hence the choice is forced) and believing that P would increase the probability that P is true (hence P is doxastically dependent). 1. above) in order to illustrate how the notion of evidential support should be restricted. The professor has in his hand todays newspaper which contains the listings of movies at the theater and their times. How to be a Fallibilist., DeRose, Keith. Scott Aikin provides an analysis and evaluation of William Cliffords case for evidentialism and William James alternative. There are stronger and weaker versions of evidentialism. The aim is not to respond to these objections on behalf of the evidentialist nor to evaluate their strength. We do not proceed in conformance with Cliffords evidentialist thesis, nor should we. Contrary to the evidentialist, James argues that one can justifiably believe that God exists in the absence of supporting evidence if both believing that God exists and failing to believe that God exists are live options for one. All of this seems to be uncontroversial, but this is just to explain how evidence works so as to justify one in believing that certain propositions are true. Feldman claims that this is the central epistemological question; it alone determines the justificatory status of ones beliefs. Also suppose that fifteen years ago I heard reliable testimony that one newscaster, Mick Stuppagin, almost always provides incorrect reports. As is the case with theories in all areas of philosophy, objections such as those developed above help to guide philosophers towards more promising formulations of the theory. The details of the cases proposed along these lines are crucial, for evidentialists may be able to motivate a denial of the critics justificatory assessment of one of the cases.
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